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How Big is the Tax Advantage to Debt?
ABSTRACT
This paper uses an option valuation model of the firm to answer the
question, "What magnitude tax advantage to debt s consistent with
the range of observed corporate debt ratios?" We incorporate into the
model differential personal tax rates on capital gains and ordinary
income. We conclude that variations in the magnitude of bankruptcy
costs across firms can not by itself account for the simultaneous
existence of levered and unlevered firms. When it is possible for
the value of the underlying assets to junip discretely to zero, dif-
ferences across firms in the probability of this jump can account for
the simultaneous existence of levered and unlevered firms.
Moreover, if the tax advantage to debt is small, the annual rate of
return advantage offered by optimal leverage may be so small as to
make the firm indifferent about debt policy over a wide range of
debt—to—firm value ratios.
Alex Kane, Alan J. Marcus




Boston, MPL 02215HOW BIG IS THE TAX ADVANTAGE TO DEBT ?
Theobserved range of debt—to—firm—value ratios in the U.S. economy is,
roughly speaking, from zero to 60 percent. Traditional explanatory models of
capital structure have focused on the tradeoff between the tax shield and
bankruptcy costs arising from the use of debt finance 2,9,10,18,19]. Other
models have focused on information issues, such as agency costs [7,16] and
signalling [17], though it is fair to say that bankruptcy costs are still
thought to be an important determinant of debt structure.
One important recent criticism of the bankruptcy cost models was that of
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benefitsof debt to explain the existence of unlevered firms. Instead, Miller
argued that taking personal as well as corporate taxation into account
eliminated any net tax advantage of debt finance, so that individual firms
would be indifferent about financial policy. DeAngelo and Masulis [4],
however, argued that if there were bankruptcy costs (which Miller ignored),
then the net tax advantage to debt would in equilibrium be low but positive,
exactly offsetting marginal bankruptcy costs. Every firm. could have a
determinate debt structure based on the tax advantage—bankruptcy cost
tradeoff, no matter how small bankruptcy costs were.
Surprisingly, there is no evidence as to whether bankruptcy—cost models
which take account of personal as well as corporate taxes can explain the
observed range of debt ratios in the U.S. economy. It is known that a
bankruptcy cost model will predict high debt ratios——even with large
bankruptcy costs——when the corporate tax rate is set at 50 percent and
personal taxes are ignored (Kim, [9]). It is not known whether such a model
has reasonable explanatory power when the net tax advantage to debt is much
lower, as it would be in the DeAngelo—Masulis equilibrium.
In this paper we develop a valuation model for a levered firm with—2—
bankruptcy costs, incorporating personal taxes, and attempt to see whether
such a model can potentially account for the observed range of debt—equity
ratios in the U.S. We find that differences across firms in bankruptcy costs
alone cannot account for the simultaneous existence of levered and unlevered
firms. Next, we use simulation analysis to determine a reasonable
cross—sectional range for optimal debt ratios, given the taxadvantage to
debt. The simulation results indicate that if the tax advantage to debt is
small, then the cost of substantially deviating from the optimal debt ratio is
small (in a sense we make precise). In this sense, the model is consistent
wjth a wide range of observed debt ratios. These results leave open the
possibility that other factors, such as moral hazard considerations, may be
more important determinants of debt policy than traditional tax and
bankruptcy—cost considerations.
Several authors have developed similar models to examine the tradeoff
between the tax advantage and potential bankruptcy cost attributable to debt
finance. In particular, Turnbull [19] and Brennan and Schwartz [2] use
option—valuation models to value a levered firm and derive optimal debt
positions. The aivantage of their contingent claims framework is that the
valuation formula requires only easily interpreted and estimated parameters.
Our model uses the contingent claims methodology, but differs
significantly from that used by Turnbull and Brennan and Schwartz. We
incorporate personal taxes and allow for the possibility that the underlying
asset ——unleveredcapital ——followsa mixed jump—diffusion process rather
than a simple diffusion process. In addition, if there is a net tax advantage
to debt, and if there are no arbitrage opportunities in the market for
physical assets, then it will be suboptimal for investors to hold unlevered
capital. Consequently, unlike the earlier papers, we assume that unlevered
assets are not held by investors. Incorporating this into the derivation—3—
provides us with a measure of the advantage to leverage which is a flow
measure (the extra rate of return earned by a levered firm) rather than the
standard stock measure (the extra price that would be paid for a levered
firm). The flow measure provides an easily interpreted notion of what
constitutes a "large" advantage to debt finance.1 Also, the solution
implicitly accounts forthe firm's rebalancing its capital structure at
periodic intervals. Finally, the previous papers assume that the tax
deduction attributable to debt is based on an exogenously given coupon rate.
In this paper, the tax deduction is endogenous A weakness of the model is
that we do not allow the firm to go bankrupt except at maturity (c.f. [2J).
Section 1 of the paper sets out the model and analytic solutions for debt
and equity values. Section 2 proves that marginal bankruptcy costs are
generally zero at a zero debt level, which implies that an all—equity capital
structure is suboptimal regardless of the magnitude of bankruptcy costs as
long as there is some tax advantage to debt. Section 3presents simulations
snowing equilibrium debt to value ratios for a variety of personal tax rates.
The results suggest that the marginal personal tax rate on interest income
must be quite close to the corporate tax rate to account for the range of debt
ratios commonly observed in the U.S. and that at those tax rates the
equilibrium advantage to leverage is small. Section 4 concludes.
1. Valuation of the Firm
We will value the levered firm relative to the value of its unlevered
assets, the market value of which is assumed to evolve according to the
stochastic process:2
dA =(a+A)Adt+aAdz+Adq (1)
where dz is a Wiener process, aisthe instantaneous expected rate of return
on A and aisthe instantaneous standard deviation of the rate of return, and—4—
dq is a Poisson process which takes on value —1 with probability xdt and value
0 otherwise. The jump process is a generalization of the usual diffusion
process used in earlier contingent—claims analysis of debt structure. We will
assume that dq is uncorrelated with the market in order to obtain closed—form
solutions,
For simplicity, we model the levered firm as issuing pure discount bonds
with maturity T, which can be rolled over at maturity. The debt affects the
value of the firm via two channels. First, it creates the possibility of
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thecurrent value of the firm.. However, offsetting the bankruptcy cost is a
tax shield generated by the tax deductibility of interest payments.
To calculate the tax shield, let D denote the face value of the bonds and
P0 the market value of t.he debt at the issue date, 0. Then the yield on the
bond is defined by p =4-ln(D/P0)
and the interest attributed for tax
purposes at time t is pP =pP0ePt,where P is the value ascribed to
the bond by the tax authorities at time t. (This value need not equal the
actual market value of the bond at t except at t=0.) The implicit interest
generates a cash flow of wheredenotes the corporate tax rate.
We assume that the firm is prevented by a bond covenant frompayingout
dividends before the debt matures, The tax deduction is invested ma special
account at rate rIS.The funds thus invested grow at an after tax rate
of r(1—), so that the tax shield, TS, accumulates by I to a value of
T
r15(1)(T_t) r (1—)T





Weassume a full loss—offset provision, so that the tax shield accumulates in
all states of nature, except those in which the firm is bankrupt at maturity.
We model bankruptcy costs, B (conditional on bankruptcy occurring), as—5—





The model we develop below is partial equilibrium, but is consistent with a
general equilibrium in which all firms and investors face the same statuory
tax rates respectively, with bankruptcy costs differing across firms.It is
obvious that if the tax advantage differs across firms, debt ratios will differ,
so we do not consider this possibility.
A. Boundary Conditions
Let P(A,D,T), S(A,D,T) and V(A,D,T) denote the market values of debt,
equity and firm value at 1. The payoffs to claimants at time I depend upon
whether or not the tax shield is lost in bankruptcy.4 We treat both cases:
Case 1: Tax shield lost in event of bankruptcy.
Event P(A,D,T) S(A,D,T) V(A,D,T)
ATS>D 0 A—DTS ATS
D>ATS>B+TS A—B 0 A—B (3a)
D>ATS and B>A 0 0 0
In the event that B+TS>D, the second event does not occur.
Case 2: Tax shield retained in bankruptcy.
Event P(A,D,T) S(A,D,T) V(A,D,T)
ATS>D 0 A—DTS ATS
D>ATS>B A+TS—B 0 ATS—B (3b)
B>A+TS 0 0 0
In the event that B>D, the second event again does not occur.In Case 2, it
is easiest to think of the tax shield proceeds as literally being invested in
a special account or financial asset. Thus, even if firm value jumps to zero,
the tax shield remains.
The foregoing are terminal boundary conditions. It is also necessary to
characterize the relationship between V0 and A0. Brennan and Schwartz and
Turnbull do so by assuming that both V and A are the prices of assets which
are willingly held by investors. This assumption implies the ongoing—6—
existence of unlevered assets even in a world with a tax advantage to debt.
In this world, V0 >A0,
and it would be possible for investors to perform
arbitrage by purchasing unlevered assets and levering them. We assume, to the
contrary, that equilibrium in the market for unlevered assets precludes the
existence of such arbitrage opportunities, so that V0 =A0.
Our
assumption implies that rio investor would buy and hol.d an unlevered asset
without levering it. Thus A is not the price of an asset which would be
willingly be held by investors.
B. Valuation Equations for Debt and Equity
We now derive the partial differential equations (p.d.e.s) which must be
satisfied by the values of debt and equity. We will follow Constantinides [3]
in using the CAPM5 to derive the p.d.e. for each security. The CAPM
approach is appropriate in this case because the underlying asset, A, would
never be held as an unlevered asset in and of itself, since to hold A would be
to forego valuable tax shields. The usual formation of the Black—Scholes [1]
hedge portfolio is therefore inappropriate. In addition, the possibility of a
jump in A precludes the formation of a riskiess hedge portfolio. The
equilibrium (versus arbitrage) approach avoids these problems.
Denote by u and g the tax rates on debt and equity income. We assume that
all returns on debt and equity are taxed on accrual, and that all investors
are in the same tax bracket. The after tax expected rates of return on the
market and on thstantaneously riskiess bonds therefore can be written as
(l_g)r (assuming all returns to equity are taxed at the capital gains rate)
and (1—u)r. Written in terms of after—tax rates of return, the intertemporal




where E(.) is the expectations operator, S denotes the value of equity,
S(A, 0, t), and is the beta of the after—tax return on levered equity
with the after tax market return. There are no dividend payments.
To derive an expression for note that the diffusion components of S
and A are instantaneously perfectly correlated, with =
aAS1/S(Galai
and Masulis, [6]). Therefore, since the jump is non—systematic,
ASA
BS =T
where8A is the beta of the after—tax rate of return on the underlying






equilibrium required rate of return on an asset with a beta of
differs from aifand only if there is value to leverage. (See below.)
Finally using Ito's lemma6 to derive E(dS/S) and substituting that





whereis defined as a*.a,subscriptsdenote partial derivatives, and the
fact that S(O,D,T) =0is used to eliminate one of the jump terms. will be
positive precisely when the underlying asset is priced to reflect tax shields
which the asset in and of itself does not pay. measures the rate of return
deficiency of A, which arises because A is priced to reflect the debt (and
concomitant tax shields) that it can support, while the capital gains rateon
A by itself does not include those tax shields. The rate of appreciationon A
alone (as opposed to the total rate of return on the levered firm) will
therefore not be sufficient to compensate the investor for holding the—8-
asset.7 s may thus be interpreted as the penalty rate per period for
maintaining zero leverage, or equivalently, as the net tax advantage of debt
in terms of rate of return. If there were only corporate taxes (g=u=O),
would approximately equal the amortized tax shield less amortized expected
bankruptcy costs.
Equation (6) is a p.d.e. that must be satisfied by the equity valuation
formula together with the boundary conditions of Section A. Using an
analogous derivation but recalling that interest is taxed at u, the p.d.e. for
c1htran alcn h drivd
AAAa +Pt
-




P(O) =thenonstochastic value of debt in the event of a jump to zero.
Notice that the p.d.e.'s for equity and debt are not identical, and also that
the required rate of return on the unlevered assets, cz*,appearsin the p.d.e.
for debt. Both of these facts are attributable to the different tax treatment
of debt and equity. For u =g,the p,d.e.'s are identical in form.
C. Solution
The solution to equation (6) subject to the terminal boundary conditions
(3a) or (3b) is:
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The debt solution, however, depends on whether (3a) or (3b) holds:8
Case 1: Tax Shield lost in bankruptcy
Because the tax shield is lost in bankruptcy, we have P(O,D,T)=O.
Nevertheless, we must distinguish two cases. If D—TS>B, the solution to (7) is
—r I —r1T _*T
P(A, 0, 0) =Ae N(d3) —e
1
BN(d4) +e (B÷D)N(d6) —AeN(d5) (9)
If D—TS<B, on the other hand, the solution •is
—r I









Case 2: Tax Shield retained in bankruptcy.
If TS<B, then P(0,D,T)=0 as before, and the solution to (7) is
—rT —rT






On the other hand, if TS>B, then P(O,D,t)=(TS_B)e_Tt), and the
solution to (7) is—10—
—rI —r I
P(A,D,O) =Ae ÷(TS—B)e +e
1
(B—TS÷D)N(d5) —Ae N(d5) (12)
where
ln(A/(B-TS)) +(r1_*+a2/2)T
d7= alT , d3=d7—a/T
The value of the firm in all cases is given by
V(A, 0, 0) =P(A,0, 0) +S(A,0, 0). (13)
These equations can only be solved implicitly, since the tax shield enters the
cumulative normal density, and it is a function of P. Furthermore, s is also
determined endogenously. As noted above, we will also impose the requirement
that V0 =A0,which amounts toruling out arbitrage resulting from
levering up unlevered assets. The market values of assets are assumed to
fully reflect the value of debt they can support.
The solutions presented above are fully consistent with a multiperiod
interpretation in which the firm reoptimizes its debt position at the end of
every period, although it appears to be cast in a one—period (of duration T)
context. Because the firm can freely rebalance capital structure at, the
maturity date, it can make a leverage decision looking ahead only one period.
The rebalancing feature is embodied in the boundary condition: Firm value at I
reverts to A. A equals the value of the optimally levered firm, because
equilibrium in the market for assets requires that the underlying asset be bid
to a level which reflects the potential of leverage. Thus, even if debt
policy is temporarily suboptimal, the market value of the underlying asset at
maturity will reflect future gains from leverage.
2.Is Zero Debt Ever Optimal?
We now ask whether bankruptcy costs can help explain the simultaneous
existence of levered and unlevered firms. The general conclusion of this
section is that when the tax advantage to debt is positive, however small, it—11—
is never optimal for firms to have strictly zero debt, however large their
bankruptcy costs. If the tax advantage is literally zero, then in one case
(when the tax shield is not lost in bankruptcy and TS>B) it is optimal for all
firms to have positive leverage. In all other cases they are indifferent
about the debt—equity ratio in the vicinity of zero debt if the Miller
condition holds. Thus, unless the Miller condition holds, bankruptcy cost
models are inconsistent with the simultaneous existence of both levered and
unlevered firms.
A. Case 1 and Case 2 (TS<B).
In these cases, the equations for P are given by equations (9), (10), and
(11). In each case, as D approaches zero, the market value of debt, P,
approaches Dexp(—r1T) and the yield to maturity on the debt, p,approaches
r1. If we also assume that r15 =r1,then as D approaches zero the
value of the tax shield approaches
—r1T +rTC(1—)T
TS=D[1—e ] (14)
The assumption rTS=rl implies that the firm earns an actuarially fair rate
of return on the tax shield. Since in each case the firm loses the tax shield
in bankruptcy (in Case 2 bankruptcy costs exhaust the tax shield), the
proceeds from the tax shield must be invested not at r, but at r+x (ignoring
taxes) to account for bankruptcy risk. Using (14), it is possible to show that
-r2T r[(1-) -(lu)]T
=e [1 -e -g)
(15) a
D=0
If the Miller [15] condition holds [i.e., 1—ô=(1—u)/(1—g)], the marginal gain
from issuing debt is zero at zero debt. Therefore, ifrTS =r1,aV/aD =0
at zero debt regardless of the magnitude of bankruptcy costs. This result has
the interpretation that marginal bankruptcy costs are always zero at zero
debt. The marginal contribution from the tax shield is positive if—12—
1—<(1—u)/(1—g). If there is a positive tax advantage to debt, all firms
should issue positive debt, since (16) is independent of bankruptcy costs.If
the tax shield proceeds are irwested at a rate less than r1, then it will be
optimal for all firms to issue zero debt when the Miller condition holds.
Indifference requires that the Miller condition hold and that rTS=rl.
•
B. Case II (TS>B).
In the cases just considered, the tax shield is always lost in the event
the firm bankrupts, so that the firm receives the tax deduction for interest
payments only in those states of the world where full interest is actually
paid on the debt. If the tax shield is not lost in bankruptcy and TS>B, then
issuing debt generates at least a partial tax deduction for interest payments
even in states where the firm does not actually make interest payments. This
is clearly a gain for the firm's security holders at the expense of the
government in these states, since corporate tax deductions are taken on the
interest without personal taxes being paid. Thus, even if the Miller
condition holds, the firm will issue a positive amount of debt in order to
take advantage of this gain in loss states.
The discussion in this section has assumed that r15 =r1.If x >0,
it is possible that rIS <r1,In this case, differences in x across firms
can account for different debt policies. In particular, if there were a small
positive tax advantage to debt, firms with x=0 would issue positive debt (with
the amount depending on firm—specific parameters such as the level of
bankruptcy costs), and firms with sufficiently great x would issue no debt.
3. Simulation esults
To derive the optimal debt ratio for any set of parameters, we maximize V
with respect to 0. As we have argued, however, if the value A is bid up in
equilibrium to reflect the optimal debt position assets can support, then it—.13—
must be true that V(A, D, 0) =Aat the optimal level of D. To satisfy these
conditions we must find the value of 6whichsolves the problem
Max V(D;6) subject to V(D*; 6)= A.
D
The value of 6isendogenously determined as part of the solution, and is
precisely the equilibrium net tax advantage of debt expressed as a rate of
retutn. The problem of optimal debt structure is equivalent to that of
choosingD to maximize 6,subjectto the constraint that A0 =V0.The
level of debt which maximizes firm value is also the level which maximizes the
tax advantage net of bankruptcy penalties.
We report simulation results corresponding to a real interest rate of 2
percent, bankruptcy costs of 15 percent of debt (b0 =0,b1 =.15),a
rebalancing interval of 1 year, and an annual standard deviation of 25
percent. Note that this value of amustbe interpreted as the standard
deviation of the rate of return of the unlevered
LWe also allow x, the
probability that the value of the assets jump to zero, to equal both 0 and
.01. It is assumed that the tax shield is lost in bankruptcy and that
rTS=r, independent of x. Both assumptions are designed to minimize the
importance of debt. Nevertheless, optimal debt ratios are quite high.
Figure 1 displays the optimal debt ratios as a function of the personal
tax rate on debt (g is set equal to zero). The corporate tax rate is set
equal to .46 and we then calculate debt ratios and 6fordifferent personal
tax rates. The tax rate on the horizontal axis in the figures should be
interpreted as 1(1—u)/(1—g), which equals the actual rate of tax on
interest income for g=0.In the Miller equilibrium (1—u)/(1—g) equals 1 minus
the corporate tax rate, at which point there is no tax advantage to debt. In
the graph, it can be seen that the debt ratio falls to zero at this point,—14—
reflecting the fact that with possible bankruptcy and no tax advantage,
optimal debt must be zero. The graphs for different A'S are almost
indistinguishable, although debt ratios are higher for the firm with =.01.
The most striking characteristic of the graph is the extremely sharp
increase in debt ratios as the personal tax rate falls just below the
corporate rate and the fairly flat increase in the ratio thereafter. We have
found that this general shape occurs for virtually any set of parameters
and that the optimal debt ratio is relatively insensitive to a change in
bankruptcy costs. The debt-to-value ratio reaches approximately 40 percent
as soon as there is a small difference in the corporate and personal tax rates.
These results suggest that the tax advantage to debt would need to be approximately
zero for the range of observed debt ratios to be consistent with the model.
Figure 2 displays the annual rate of return advantage to debt, ó, for X=O
and A=.01. When A rises, both debt ratios and s rise. With greater x the risk
premium on debt, and hence the tax shield, are greater. This induces more debt.
Bankruptcy is also more probable, but this does not discourage debt; a jump to
so that
zero will induce bankruptcy, however little debt the firm has issued,! more debt
does not increase the chance of a bankruptcy due to a jump. Our estimates of the
rate of return advantage to debt are extremely small. The net advantage falls
below one-half of one percent per year for personal tax rates above 35 percent.
At personal tax rates of 40 percent, the net advantage is generally below two-tenths
of a percent. The penalty of suboptimal leverage would thus be small.
Other comparative static properties of the model are straightforward.9
The optimal debt level arid the rate of return advantage to debt are larger for
smaller bankruptcy costs, for smaller standard deviations and for shorter
rebalancing intervals. The last result is attributable to the fact that
shorter rebalancing intervals reduce the probability of bankruptcy for any
level of debt. A reduction in T thus allows the firm to maintain a higher—15—
debt ratio with a greater tax shield. With no debt issue costs, the optimal
rebalancing interval would be zero and firms would always be fully levered.
Figure 3 (in which x=0) shows the rate of return penalty (the amount by
which 6 is less than the maximum possible) for firms with positive, but
below—optimal debt, and for firms with above—optimal debt)0 The figure
shows clearly that it is more costly to exceed the optimal debt ratio by a
given amount than to fall below that ratio. The penalty for being unlevered
when the personal tax rate is 30 percent is less than 20. basis points, while
with a personal tax rate of 45.5 percent, the penalty is under one basis
point. The asymmetry suggests that we would be likelier to observe firms with
too little debt, as opposed to firms with too much debt.
These simulation results suggest that, on the whole, the bankruptcy
cost/tax advantage model provides little insight into the determination of
capital structure. When calculated at values consistent with observed debt
ratios of below 50 percent, the equilibrium rate of return advantage of
optimal leverage is so small as to be nearly unnoticeable.
4. Conclusion
We have presented a model of optimal debt policy which incorporates
personal taxes and bankruptcy costs. The solution of the model suggests that
the advantage of debt finance is best measured as a rate of return per
period. Simulation results indicate that the advantage of debt measured in
this way is quite small for reasonable parameters. The personal tax rate must
be extremely close to the corporate rate in order to explain the existence of
unlevered firms, and, at those rates, the annual rate of return advantage to
debt is small. We conclude that the tax advantage/bankruptcy cost tradeoff is
unlikely to play a major role in explaining observed leverage patterns.—16—
Footnotes
1. Consider the Modigliani—Miller formula for the value of a levered firm:
VL =+ oD,where o is the corporate tax rate and D is the value of
debt issued by the firm. The formula can be misleading: an unlevered firm
would sell for V only if it was certain that the firm would never
become levered in the future. Thus, the cost to a firm of failing to
become levered today is not oD. Rather it is the reduction in value
associated with the length of time for which the firm will be unlevered.
2. This process fully accounts for the effect of corporate taxation on value,
except for the incremental-value from the tax shield on debt. In assuming
a full loss offset, we ignore the possibility that inability to use tax
shields may affect debt policy (c.f. [4]).
3. At an opposite extreme, it also would have been possible to model the tax
shield as paid out to equity holders in an initial dividend. In this
case, the tax shield would be certain, and we would have inferred an even
lower range for the net tax advantage to debt than that reported below.
4. Does the firm in fact lose the tax shield in bankruptcy? To the extent
that the firm reinvests previous deductions for interest expense, it is
reasonable to treat this part of the tax shield like any other asset that
is not lost in bankruptcy. If the tax shield is literally kept in a
special separate account, then it would not be lost even if firm value
jumped to zero. However, if the firm has unused interest deductions and
it goes bankrupt, these would likely be lost, since under the Internal
Revenue Code the unused deductions would be offset against the gain from
repaying the debt at a discount. (This gain would otherwise not be
taxed.) Thus given our assumption that the tax shield is contained in a
special account, we conclude that if the debt is long maturity most of the—17—
tax shield would not be lost in bankruptcy, while if the debt was short
maturity, it would be.
5. Any mean—variance of security pricing would generate the same result.
6. Merton [12] discusses Ito's Lemma for mixed jump—diffusion processes.
7. The importance of the rate—of—return shortfall in option pricing models is
elaborated in McDonald and Siegel [11].
8. A stochastic bankruptcy cost can be incorporated into the valuation
formula. Assume that bankruptcy costs follow
dB =pBdt+sBdw
This specification allows to be random in the proportional cost case
and it would allow b0 to be random in the fixed bankruptcy cost case.
In general, the solution will depend (because B is a non—traded asset)
upon the correlation of B with the market. If we consider the special
case where =0, and where B is uncorrelated with both A and with the
market, then the solution (9) is unchanged, except that in d3 and d4,
a2 is replaced by a2 +S2.It is straightforward to find the
solution in cases of non—zero drift, and with general correlations between
B, A, and the market, by applying the methods in Fischer [5].
9. Kane, Marcus and McDonald [8] study the properties of a similar model in
greater detail.
10. The rate of return penalty for a nonoptimal debt ratio is calculated as
the percentage decline in firm value for maintaining that debt ratio for
one period, and then optimally rebalancing. This penalty is calculated
assuming that the prices of assets in the economy are bid up to reflect
the gains from optimal leverage policy. The value ofused in the
calculations is therefore the rate of return premium to optimal leverage,
as in the other simulations. As with the other figures, we have found that
the shape of Ftgure 3 is not sensftive to parameter choice.—18—
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